The power structure in rural areas during the Republic of China
However, this situation gradually changed with the implementation of the "New County System." Under the "New County System," township heads were entrusted with significant responsibilities by the state authority. The township head can be said to wield considerable power. According to the regulations of the "New County System," the township head also serves as the captain of the township militia and the principal of the township central school. In some areas, the township head additionally holds the position of president of the township credit cooperative. Furthermore, townships possess their own independent budgets and have the authority to levy taxes on their residents for their financial expenditures. In this regard, the township head holds the power to control the political, military, economic, and cultural education aspects of the township. The township office resembles a formal government office, with a staff structure typically consisting of around twenty people, but often reaching forty to fifty in practice. It includes positions such as section chief, clerk, legal advisor, document officer, administrative officer, accountant, and household registration officer, as well as armed militia. According to a person named Li Yuebo, when he graduated from junior high school, he intended to continue his studies, but his father-in-law, maternal uncle, and cousin all advised him against further education, suggesting he take a position in the township office to "enhance the family reputation and bring glory to the ancestors." Since township public service can bring honor, power, wealth, and status, such positions naturally became targets for local elites to compete for.
Taking Hunan as an example. At the beginning of the War of Resistance, Zhang Zhizhong was in charge of Hunan. He, "in light of the failures caused by local autonomy being in the hands of local tyrants in the past," proposed a grand plan for a "thorough transformation of grassroots institutions" as soon as he took office: mobilizing educated youth and students to go to the countryside, creating a combination of new intellectuals, new youth, and farmers. He first gathered 4,000 urban male and female students with a high school education or above and sent them to various counties to carry out a six-month civil training program. He then published a large announcement in the newspapers, registering intellectuals to serve as various officials in counties and cities, planning to train 50,000 intellectuals within six months to serve as village heads, township heads, and county heads, replacing the original local grassroots officials, thereby completely transforming the grassroots political power below the county level throughout Hunan Province. This ambitious plan by Zhang Zhizhong caused a tremendous response nationwide at the time. However, what was the outcome of this plan? Zhang Zhizhong later recalled: "When I left Hunan, this arduous project had not yet been fully launched." Zhang took office as the Governor of Hunan Province in December 1937 and left in January 1939, a little over a year. In such a short period, it was difficult to see results; however, in the historical context of the time, if revolutionary means were not used to eliminate the local tyrants and evil gentry in the countryside, the desire to thoroughly transform grassroots political power would inevitably become a mere illusion.
Chiang Kai-shek believed that the position of district chief was usurped by local tyrants because it was a low-ranking position that could not attract talent. In fact, during this period, the grassroots social elites were generally 'rising up,' making it difficult to find qualified candidates for the county chief position. As the regime penetrated deeper, the candidates became increasingly mixed and chaotic. It was thus inevitable that local tyrants would seize power.
However, although the wealthy bullies have seized some of the power resources in rural areas, they do not possess the personal charisma and legal authority characteristic of traditional literati gentry. The resource base upon which they dominate grassroots society is merely coercive violence or financial power. In this context, as state power expands downwards, it provides them with a great opportunity to usurp legal authority.
Around 1933, the Central Research Institute conducted a survey of 104 village heads in Wuxi, Jiangsu, and found that most of these village heads were wealthy landlords with substantial land holdings. Among the 104 village heads, the largest landholdings reached several thousand acres, while the smallest were around twenty to thirty acres, with an average of 122 acres.
The situation of local governance in Hubei being usurped by local tyrants and corrupt gentry remained largely unchanged until the 1940s. According to regulations, district heads should avoid their native places, but in reality, this was difficult to implement due to resistance from local tyrants. For instance, an investigation in 1940 regarding Jun County in Hubei revealed: "It is difficult for outsiders to be selected as district heads; even if they come, it is hard for them to serve. All candidates are from the county itself." Due to the strong influence of local tyrants, county heads were often coerced by them. Some county heads, in order to retain their positions, colluded with local tyrants. The Hubei provincial government stated in an order to all county heads in April 1938: "It is necessary to organize and strengthen the county and district offices to assist county heads in implementing administrative orders among the people, thereby enhancing administrative efficiency. Our government has issued the 'Guidelines for Local Government Operations in Hubei Province during Extraordinary Times,' which states in Article 12: 'If a district head is incompetent, the county head may directly remove them and appoint a replacement.' This gives county heads the authority to select personnel, allowing them to eliminate the unfit and retain the capable. However, it has been found that most county heads do not understand this directive. When a district head or district member is absent, they often favor local tyrants, engage in nepotism, make hasty requests, or report for record-keeping, with some even being reported by local residents for their misconduct before any formal report was made. According to the field investigation reports from the Hubei Provincial Civil Affairs Department, it was common for district head positions to be usurped by local tyrants, with some county heads even bribing local tyrants for the positions of district heads and joint guarantee directors, with prices ranging from hundreds to thousands of yuan. These local tyrant district heads used state power as a shield, extorting wealth from the people, acquiring vast tracts of land, oppressing the populace, and acting arbitrarily, which became a widespread issue.
6. Conclusion
The efforts of state power to penetrate rural society began in the late Qing Dynasty with the New Policies. However, it was not until the 1930s and 1940s, during the governance of the Kuomintang, that the state authority truly infiltrated rural society. After coming to power, the Kuomintang faced challenges from warlords and local strongmen. In order to establish a strong central authority, the Kuomintang was committed to enhancing its political legitimacy, military control, economic extraction, and social mobilization capabilities. For the Kuomintang, a passive, ineffective, and weak grassroots government was inadequate to cope with the serious situation of "internal troubles and external threats." The Kuomintang consistently focused on strengthening its political legitimacy, military control, economic extraction, and social mobilization capabilities. Particularly after several defeats in the "suppression of communism" campaigns, Chiang Kai-shek recognized that to counter the Communist Party's strategy of "surrounding the cities from the countryside," it was essential to strengthen local grassroots governance.
Below 100 acres, above 100 acres, total landlords, wealthy farmers, and small merchants, total.
This type of training has often been used by local authorities as a means to superficially comply with regulations or to embellish their achievements. Moreover, there are ambitious individuals who, by organizing training institutions, cultivate private factions and deploy their minions to expand their own influence, which ultimately leads to a waste of administrative resources or becomes a source of corrupt governance. Additionally, there are numerous instances where training is used as a shield, with organizations such as alumni associations providing support, colluding with local tyrants, and causing harm to the community. According to contemporary views, the purpose of the Kuomintang's training of grassroots administrative personnel was to 'employ new talent and implement new policies,' yet the outcome was counterproductive: firstly, it granted new identities to the old local tyrants; secondly, it produced a new batch of local tyrants, referred to at the time as 'scientific local tyrants.'
Provincial and municipal agencies 246565103974371988722527
Central Authority 31113812388797831532856
This point can be substantiated by the effectiveness of various training programs for grassroots administrative personnel held in different provinces at that time. According to statistics from 1942, over 1.16 million grassroots administrative personnel had been trained nationwide, among which nearly 800,000 were township and village leaders. In relation to the total number of grassroots administrative personnel in the country at that time, the number of trained individuals was still less than 10%. In the following years, provincial authorities continued their training efforts, and by around 1949, approximately more than half of the township and village leaders nationwide had received training. However, what was the actual effectiveness of the training? Here, it is worth quoting an observation from that period:
Civil servants, public service technicians, and police officers in total
Due to the Kuomintang's need to both "maintain internal stability" and "resist external threats," it is essential to vigorously draw upon and mobilize the human and material resources of civil society, necessitating a strengthening of control over rural society. At the same time, after the establishment of the Nanjing regime in 1927, the Kuomintang's ideology and class foundation underwent a transformation. Therefore, neither the first nor the second option is desirable for the Kuomintang, leaving only the third option.
Compared to traditional society, the bureaucratic organization during the Kuomintang period underwent significant changes. In response to the major upheaval of "internal troubles and external threats," the Kuomintang could not govern in a laissez-faire manner like traditional dynasties. With the decline of traditional literati and gentry, the rural self-governing networks below the county level had already collapsed. In this context, to achieve integration and control across various social strata, the Kuomintang had no choice but to establish a massive bureaucratic structure resembling a pyramid, extending from the central government down to the grassroots. Compared to previous dynasties, the Kuomintang indeed established a large bureaucratic apparatus. According to statistics from 1948, there were over 557,000 civil servants at the central and provincial levels of the Kuomintang, along with more than 697,000 personnel in public service, technical roles, and police (as shown in the table below). The actual number of county-level civil servants during this period has not been comprehensively documented. Based on the staffing structure implemented after the introduction of the "New County System" in 1939, it can be estimated that there were approximately 100 civil servants in the direct agencies of a county government and another 100 in subordinate agencies. Therefore, the total number of county-level civil servants nationwide is likely around 600,000. If we sum the civil servants at the central, provincial, and county levels, the total exceeds 1.15 million, which is more than 74 times the total number of civil officials during the Qing Dynasty.
5. The Decentralization of National Power and Its Impact on Rural Society
According to the current "County Organization Law", the various townships below the county level were originally planned to be divided into several districts, each with a district office established as a local self-governing body. However, the organization is neither sound nor well-structured, the selection of personnel is extremely mixed, and funding is particularly inadequate. The local populace views the district heads no differently than the former village leaders, and they do not hold them in any special esteem. Consequently, many virtuous individuals in the local community are hesitant to step forward, while the unscrupulous rush to take positions. As a result, most district heads are controlled by corrupt and incompetent individuals, leading to insufficient enforcement of administrative orders and excessive oppression of the populace.
For the Kuomintang regime, the monopoly of local resources and the encroachment on state power by local tyrants and evil gentry undoubtedly hindered the state's control over rural society and the extraction of rural financial resources. Therefore, in the early 1930s, Chiang Kai-shek issued the "Regulations on Punishing Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry," and provinces such as Henan, Hubei, and Jiangsu successively took serious measures against a few local tyrants and evil gentry who abused their power. However, due to the inability of the Kuomintang regime to dispatch a large bureaucratic team to penetrate rural areas and strengthen grassroots governance, in this context, to maintain grassroots order and extract rural manpower and financial resources, the Kuomintang still had to rely on and depend on the power of local tyrants and evil gentry to carry out the state's mobilization, extraction, and control over rural society. Local tyrants and evil gentry used positions such as district and township leaders conferred by the Kuomintang regime as tools, took various "new policies" initiated by the Kuomintang regime as excuses, and seized the opportunity of the Kuomintang regime's mobilization and extraction of rural manpower and material resources to fully exploit their predatory and exploitative nature. As a result, the deeper the Kuomintang regime penetrated, the more opportunities local tyrants and evil gentry had to usurp state power, the larger their ranks became, and the more intense the oppression of the peasants grew. The Kuomintang could only allow these local tyrants and evil gentry to wantonly plunder the power and resources of local society without being able to control or manage them, leading to a severe state of disorder where the county government was "unable to defend against or withdraw from" the situation. The tax burden on peasants became increasingly heavy, government authority declined, and social unrest ensued. It was this kind of malignant and unorganized force that ultimately consumed the foundation of the Kuomintang's grassroots regime.
A review of the original archival materials from the township-level authorities in Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan during this period reveals a widespread phenomenon of township heads abusing their power and engaging in misconduct. Some wield firearms with arrogance, dominating local areas, resisting higher authorities, and committing acts of malfeasance against the populace; others engage in nepotism and corruption, embezzling funds, protecting gambling and drug activities, selling conscripts, and imposing arbitrary taxes. In the early 1940s, an inspector from the Hubei Provincial Civil Affairs Department lamented, "The current lower-level politics can be termed as local tyranny or quasi-local tyranny. These individuals hold governing power, and all matters related to conscription and labor requisition demanded by the government merely bring suffering to the impoverished populace, while they remain aloof and even profit from the situation." The county government finds it truly "impossible to guard against them, and impossible to remove them." In the existing archives of the Republic of China at the Hubei Archives, there are 1,692 case files from 1947 to 1948 in which various counties accused township heads of misconduct, with the number of accused township heads reaching into the thousands.
56.743.310091.37.71.0100
In the 1930s, district-level governments were abused by local tyrants and corrupt gentry, a common phenomenon across various provinces. In Jiangsu, district heads "generally only seek money, do not perform their duties, reside in the city, and occasionally visit the district office a few times a month." In Hubei, the situation of district heads being brutal and corrupt was even worse; not only were the common people ruthlessly oppressed, but county heads were often kidnapped and controlled by them. When the Kuomintang government attempted to separate judicial power from the county heads, the district heads consolidated administrative, judicial, and military powers in their hands. In Hubei's Jianli County, local tyrants and corrupt gentry were divided into two factions, with the old faction controlling the county's financial power, while the new faction held positions such as district heads and local teams, leaving the county head isolated and powerless. Each district head in the county established their own "special task force," each with dozens of armed men, entering and exiting with a grand entourage, exuding an imposing presence. The district office not only had complete public cases but also various torture instruments, handling civil and criminal cases, exercising life and death powers at will. One district head reportedly killed 76 people in a single day, and when the county head sought to hold him accountable afterward, there was nothing he could do. Another district head, due to a conflict with the district's security team leader, not only eliminated his opponent but also listed his "crimes" and sent a telegram nationwide, "the telegram listed the titles, reaching as far north as Beijing and Tianjin, and as far south as Guangdong and Fujian, enumerating all major cities in China, regardless of whether there were residents from Jianli, all were meticulously detailed, with a grandeur surpassing that of a national leader's announcement; he also distributed a letter to the people of Jianli, with a tone akin to that of a telegram from the chairman of the national government."
While conducting various training sessions, the National Government issued the "Examination Methods for Promoting Township and Village Defense Cadres in Various Provinces" in 1944, requiring provinces to strictly select grassroots cadres through examinations. Consequently, each province established a General Examination Committee and set up examination subcommittees in each county, with the county head serving as the director of the examination subcommittee. In Hubei, most county examination subcommittees were established around the first half of 1945, and several examinations for township and village defense cadres were subsequently held. The examinations were divided into three levels: A, B, and C. Level A candidates included the chief and deputy township heads, Level B candidates included the defense leaders and township section heads and staff, while Level C candidates included the village leaders and defense staff. The examination process consisted of a preliminary test, training, and a retest. Those who passed the preliminary test were given training, and a retest was conducted after the training concluded. The subjects of the examination generally included Chinese language, party principles, Chinese history and geography, and local autonomy. In terms of regulations and procedures, the Kuomintang government made considerable efforts to select grassroots administrative personnel; however, the actual effect was similar to that of the training, merely adding a layer of legitimacy and political protection to the existing local gentry.
Table 6.2 Statistics of Land Area and Occupations of 104 Village Heads in Wuxi, Jiangsu
A total of 5,577,032,278,614,698,191,255,383
The number of people is 59,451,049,581,104
In the past, people paid more attention to the impact of the abolition of the imperial examination in 1905 on the bureaucratic political structure of the late Qing and early Republic of China, as well as on the literati and gentry groups. In fact, the social upheaval caused by the abolition of the examination can still be distinctly and profoundly felt for nearly half a century thereafter. It not only shook the upper political system of the Qing dynasty but also affected and radiated to the grassroots rural social structure during the Republic of China period. In traditional Chinese society, approximately 90% of the gentry resided in rural areas. They were engaged in agricultural and scholarly pursuits in the countryside, and their concerns were also centered around rural affairs, including ideological education and the cultivation of elite individuals. They were the cultural mainstay of traditional rural society in China and also served as the organizers and regulators of the rural social ecological environment. Those few gentry who took up official positions in the cities would also return to their hometowns at appropriate times, which not only signified the flow of urban information, capital, and other resources to rural society but also indicated that the intellectual resources of the entire urban-rural society were in a continuous cycle of movement. However, this pattern changed with the abolition of the imperial examination in 1905. After the examination was abolished, the traditional literati and gentry's succession was interrupted, and the living and activity spaces of new intellectuals shifted from rural areas to cities, leading to a one-way flow of rural youth intellectuals to urban areas. This resulted in a significant loss and depletion of rural intellectual resources, an ongoing imbalance and degeneration of rural cultural ecology, and the loss of the centrality of rural society, along with the disappearance of its autonomy and independence. In this context, rural power was usurped and seized by local tyrants and wicked gentry. This represents an unprecedented major change in Chinese rural society over the past millennium.
Source of information: (1) "Actual Number of Personnel in Central Authorities"; (2) "Actual Number of Personnel in Provincial and Municipal Governments and Their Analysis", both archived in the Second Historical Archives of China, Volume 6 - 4930
As the Kuomintang regime penetrated from districts to townships, and from townships to local militia, the momentum of local tyrants and evil gentry seizing state power not only remained unchecked but also grew in tandem. In other words, the deeper the state power delved, the more opportunities local tyrants and evil gentry had to usurp state power, leading to a larger cohort and more intense exploitation of the peasants. When the regime was limited to the district level, the positions at that level were ultimately finite. Subsequently, as state power further descended to the township and local militia level, the positions of township heads and local militia directors became new targets for local tyrants and evil gentry.
In addition to organizational costs, the deepening of the Kuomintang regime also requires a sound organizational team. Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly emphasized that to implement the "New County System," it is essential to have capable individuals. The Kuomintang's implementation of the "New County System" requires tens of millions of grassroots cadres. Where will the talent come from? As a modern mobilization-type political party, the Kuomintang could have absorbed a large number of party members from grassroots society, and then, through strict ideological indoctrination and organizational training, continuously transformed these members into grassroots cadres. However, the construction of the Kuomintang's grassroots party organization lagged far behind its grassroots governance. Before the war, the number of Kuomintang members was limited and concentrated in urban and upper-class areas, with rural party members being extremely rare. Although the number of Kuomintang members increased during the war and the party's organization penetrated into grassroots society, overall, grassroots party organizations remained mere appendages and parasites of grassroots governance. The party did not cultivate and dispatch qualified members to serve as grassroots cadres, but indiscriminately dressed all current grassroots leaders in the guise of party members. As a result, instead of transforming qualified party members into grassroots cadres, it transformed unqualified grassroots cadres into party members.
In the prosperous era of traditional dynasties, the gentry served as intermediaries between officials and the populace, maintaining a relatively positive interactive relationship among officials, gentry, and the people. Chiang Kai-shek placed his hopes on the "just gentry," akin to the role of the scholar-officials in the feudal era who were seen as moral exemplars, guiding the people, changing customs, and promoting governance. Even during the tumultuous times of the "suppression of communism" in the 1930s and the anti-Japanese war in the 1940s, Chiang Kai-shek frequently issued proclamations to the gentry, expressing immense expectations for their role as grassroots elites. However, the situation had drastically changed; the "just gentry" that Chiang Kai-shek earnestly hoped for no longer existed, and even if they did, they were exceedingly rare. Instead, a group of oppressive local bullies and tyrants emerged. In the early 1940s, the Hubei Provincial Civil Affairs Department requested county magistrates to investigate and seek out local "just gentry," only to find that "among the current gentry, there are hardly any upright individuals worthy of selection." When Zhang Zhizhong was in charge of Hunan, he also deeply felt that "the forces of local justice are nonexistent," and upon observing the local decline, he could not help but express his sentiments, lamenting that the ancient practice of repairing bridges and roads was no longer seen today. In this context, what the Kuomintang actually relied upon was not the "just gentry," but rather the local tyrants who held power in grassroots society. These local tyrants thus seized the opportunity to usurp the legitimate power of the state, forming a complex relationship with the upper echelons of the Kuomintang that was both conflicting and intertwined, mutually dependent yet mutually constraining.
Source: Zhang Xichang, "Rural Social Investigation," pages 263-264, Dawn Publishing House, 1934
For the Kuomintang government, the arbitrary and usurping behavior of local tyrants and evil gentry regarding grassroots power undoubtedly posed a significant challenge and major concern during the expansion of state power. Consequently, at the onset of the implementation of the "New County System," the Kuomintang proposed the slogan "New People for New Governance," hoping to reclaim local power from the hands of local tyrants and evil gentry. To this end, the Kuomintang government adopted two measures: first, it legally stipulated that those who had been convicted of local tyrant and evil gentry behavior could not serve as village leaders, and it set the age limit for village leaders between 25 and 45 years; second, various provinces, counties, and districts established talent training institutions and libraries, aiming to train a group of outstanding rural youth to replace local tyrants and evil gentry in grassroots administrative positions. Regarding the first measure, its restrictions were almost negligible, as very few local tyrants and evil gentry had been convicted. As for the second measure, most provincial authorities placed considerable emphasis on it.
In the first half of the 20th century in rural China, there were two significant historical transformations in the grassroots power structure that are noteworthy: first, the transfer and transformation of rural power triggered by the abolition of the imperial examination system; second, the state's efforts to deepen and strengthen its control over rural society as the dynastic state transitioned into a party state
According to a survey conducted by the Rural Reconstruction Committee of the Executive Yuan in 1933 in rural areas of provinces such as Henan and Jiangsu, the selection of district heads was quite complex, comprising old bureaucrats, former aides, and traditional gentry, as well as graduates from new-style secondary schools and a few university graduates. Among the 87 district heads surveyed in Henan, there was 1 university graduate, 8 graduates from specialized schools, 5 secondary school graduates, 59 individuals from various training institutions, and 14 others. The 59 individuals categorized as "from various training institutions" and the 14 classified as "others" were, in fact, all part of the "miscellaneous" group that had not received formal new-style education. This group accounted for as much as 84%.
Table 6 - Statistics of the Number of Civil Servants in the National Central Government and Provincial and Municipal Agencies in 11948
Statistical profession in farmland measurement
Before the implementation of the "New County System," the powers of township heads below the district level were still limited, and most were elected by the people, with malfeasance not being widespread. Taking Jiangsu as an example, a survey conducted in 1933 indicated that the organizational structure below the district level was "villages governed by hamlets, hamlets governed by neighborhoods, with village and neighborhood heads elected by farmers, based on character, knowledge, and ability to work, and all positions were voluntary, with many unwilling to serve." This situation was similarly present in Zhejiang. During this period, township heads had responsibilities but no remuneration; even the expenses for paper, ink, and tea at the township office had to be personally subsidized by the township heads. The organizational structure at that time was "villages governed by hamlets, hamlets governed by neighborhoods, with village and neighborhood heads elected by farmers, based on character, knowledge, and ability to work, and all positions were voluntary, with many unwilling to serve." This situation was similarly present in Zhejiang. During this period, township heads had responsibilities but no remuneration; even the expenses for paper, ink, and tea at the township office had to be personally subsidized by the township heads. The duties of township heads were complex and could not be part-time; however, during this period, township heads were officially considered voluntary positions. If they were to devote themselves fully, it would inevitably affect their own professions and livelihoods. Therefore, "many township heads were reluctant to take office, and some even used the excuse of engaging in business outside, claiming they could not manage township affairs," leading to resignations. The duties of township heads were complex and could not be part-time; however, during this period, township heads were officially considered voluntary positions. If they were to devote themselves fully, it would inevitably affect their own professions and livelihoods. Therefore, "many township heads were reluctant to take office, and some even used the excuse of engaging in business outside, claiming they could not manage township affairs," leading to resignations.
The district regime was originally an extension and reinforcement of state power, yet it ultimately became a tool for local marginal forces to assert their dominance. These local tyrants and gentry lacked the personal charisma, inherent moral authority, and external legal authority characteristic of traditional literati gentry. Their control over grassroots society was based solely on coercive force or financial power. However, as the Kuomintang regime expanded downward, it provided them with an excellent opportunity to usurp legal authority. As contemporaries pointed out: "Local tyrants and gentry were indeed powerful in rural society, but their status lacked legal foundation. Now, they can issue orders to the people at any time through an autonomous body connected to the local government, demanding additional taxes and money, monopolizing local affairs under the guise of autonomy." Consequently, local tyrants and gentry became even more brutal and oppressive than before.
In the early establishment of the Kuomintang regime, its vertical penetration was still limited to the level of the county government, while district offices were considered autonomous organizations. In 1933, when investigators from the National Government's Executive Yuan Rural Revival Committee conducted surveys in the countryside, they discovered that the central organ of rural political organizations at that time was the district office, with little significance below the township level. The position of district chief became a primary target coveted by local tyrants and evil gentry during this period. This point can be corroborated by Chiang Kai-shek's remarks in 1934.
However, the 1,150,000 civil servants only filled the upper echelons of the entire Kuomintang bureaucratic system. As the Kuomintang regime penetrated deeper from counties to districts and from districts to townships, the number of civil servants increased geometrically. Before the implementation of the "New County System" in 1939, the formal bureaucratic structure below the county level only extended to the district level, and the scale of the county and district institutions was still small, with limited personnel quotas. Following the implementation of the "New County System," the bureaucratic structure extended to townships and villages, resulting in a doubling of the number of grassroots civil servants below the county level. According to rough estimates from 1942, approximately 164,612 personnel were needed at the district level, about 686,721 at the township level, and around 12,140,908 for village and neighborhood cadres, totaling 12,992,241 personnel.
For the Kuomintang regime, the monopoly of local resources by local tyrants and evil gentry, as well as their encroachment on state power, undoubtedly hindered the expansion of national authority. In August 1933, the Military Commission of the National Government in Nanchang resumed the old initiatives of the Northern Expedition and issued the "Regulations on Punishing Local Tyrants and Evil Gentry," stipulating that those who "arbitrarily dominate local affairs and mistreat civilians," "rely on their power and bully officials," "distort right and wrong and coerce officials," "bully the weak with numbers and obstruct government orders," and "falsely use names to levy taxes and fees" should be severely punished. Following the issuance of this regulation, a number of local tyrants and evil gentry were indeed punished in several provinces. However, not long after, Chiang Kai-shek issued orders prohibiting the application of the punitive regulations to "just gentry."
The district was established between 1908 and 1914. After the establishment of the Nanjing National Government, district-level organizations gradually became formalized. According to the National Government's vision, district-level authorities were responsible for various affairs including household registration, land administration, finance, public security, education, and self-governance. However, in practice, the extraction of taxes and revenues remained the central task of district-level authorities. According to regulations, district heads were appointed by the provincial government from administrative officials below the county level, were required to avoid their native places, and were directly subject to the control of county authorities. Nevertheless, the position of district head was often usurped by local tyrants, who wielded significant power and acted with impunity in rural areas, even defying the county government without fear of repercussions. Some local tyrant district heads, armed and self-important, would enter and exit the county town accompanied by a dozen or more armed followers, exuding an intimidating presence that overshadowed the county magistrate. In Huixian, Henan, there was a district head who committed numerous atrocities during his tenure, with more than ten innocent people killed by him. When the county magistrate sought to remove him from office, he even armed himself to resist the new district head's assumption of duty.
Another approach to the construction of the Kuomintang's grassroots organizations is to rely on the transformation of "just gentry" and new intellectuals into grassroots cadres after they receive training in the party's ideology. However, during this period, the grassroots society in China below the county level had already undergone significant changes compared to the period before the 19th century. As previously mentioned, following the abolition of the imperial examination system, traditional literati gentry gradually declined, new intellectuals became urbanized, and rural areas became havens for the impoverished, local ruffians, and tyrannical landlords. In this context, the Kuomintang faced three choices: first, to emulate the Chinese Communist Party by completely overthrowing the tyrannical landlords and other rural evil forces, implementing land reform, and relying on the vast peasantry to establish a grassroots government centered on farmers; second, to abandon control and management over the vast rural areas, retracting state power to the level of the county government; third, to forcibly expand and infiltrate state power downwards.
Any type of organizational construction must meet two fundamental conditions: first, there must be a certain organizational cost; second, there must be a corresponding organizational team. Before the Qing Dynasty, Chinese society had a unique organizational structure: the number of formally salaried bureaucrats was extremely small. According to statistics, by the end of the 19th century, there were 2,622 officials in the central government, 13,007 local officials, and 7,464 military officials in the Qing Dynasty, totaling approximately 23,000 individuals, while the national population had already surpassed 400 million, meaning that each formal official was responsible for managing over 17,000 people. In terms of local administrative officials, this ratio was even more disproportionate. It has been pointed out that at the end of the 18th century, each county magistrate in China governed a population of 300,000, whereas in pre-revolutionary France, each local administrative official managed a population of 3,000. Secondly, there was a vast number of informal clerical personnel. Excluding the clerks of central and provincial offices, there were said to be "300,000 clerks in a thousand counties" at the county level. It has been pointed out that at the end of the 18th century, each county magistrate in China governed a population of 300,000, whereas in pre-revolutionary France, each local administrative official managed a population of 3,000. Secondly, there was a vast number of informal clerical personnel. Excluding the clerks of central and provincial offices, there were said to be "300,000 clerks in a thousand counties" at the county level. Thirdly, there was local gentry self-governance below the county level. According to research by Zhang Zhongli, the total number of gentry in 19th century China exceeded one million. Traditional Chinese society was an integrated entity composed of tens of thousands of officials, hundreds of thousands of clerks, and millions of gentry, forming an organic connection between the upper, middle, and lower classes. This unique organizational method successfully maintained the integration of a vast agricultural society with a large population over the long course of history. Traditional Chinese society was an integrated entity composed of tens of thousands of officials, hundreds of thousands of clerks, and millions of gentry, forming an organic connection between the upper, middle, and lower classes. This unique organizational method successfully maintained the integration of a vast agricultural society with a large population over the long course of history
Looking at their economic status, those who occupy more than 300 mu account for 13.6%, those occupying between 100 and 300 mu account for 59.1%, and those occupying less than 100 mu account for 27.3%. From the economic status, it can be seen that the vast majority of them are landlords. A survey report from that time stated: "District heads, relying on their qualifications and status, often form a special power in the countryside. They monopolize lawsuits, arbitrarily allocate funds, and even commit atrocities against the innocent, creating personal tyranny and expanding individual power." At that time, the monthly salary of a district head in Henan was only about 30 to 40 yuan, while the additional income for a year was usually around 4,000 to 5,000 yuan. Even more, some district heads arbitrarily allocated funds in the countryside, sometimes distributing over 100,000 yuan in a year, while the amount submitted to the county was less than half.
During the prosperous eras of various feudal dynasties, under the premise of the integration of Confucian ideology, the governance of the upper class and the management by the gentry at the lower level were originally complementary. However, in the first half of the 20th century, the situation changed; the role of the upper-class scholars was replaced by a new type of civil servant. After the decline of the lower-class literati and gentry, the resulting "power vacuum" was filled by marginal forces such as local tyrants and corrupt gentry. The former still adhered to certain old moral standards, while the latter were entirely a lawless group of marginal forces. In this context, the Kuomintang regime forcibly expanded downwards, and not only failed to find an ideal "fulcrum" for support, but also inadvertently provided a stage and space for local tyrants and corrupt gentry to act freely.